holders in the panoply of institutions established by the Belfast Agreement-the Northern Ireland Assembly and its novel Executive, the North-South Ministerial Council, the British-Irish Council, the British-Irish intergovernmental conference, the British-Irish inter-parliamentary body. The creation of these institutions, to put it mildly, were neither Sinn Féin's nor the DUP's first preference, but their consociational and confederal logics 2 have given both sufficient incentives to participate in styles that are less overtly anti-system than their historic credentials would have suggested.
The absolute-if ultimately futile-opposition of the DUP to the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, and its more nuanced opposition to the Belfast Agreement-working within (most of) its institutions, including its executive, but criticising Sinn Féin-led to subtle shifts in the DUP's position as the elections approached. Far from calling for the Belfast Agreement to be scrapped, the DUP called for its renegotiation. The DUP's best-known rallying cries ('No Surrender') and absolute opposition to any 'Dublin interference' in Northern Ireland had morphed by 2001 into a demand that any North-South institutional relationships be rendered more palatable by requiring that they be made more fully accountable to the devolved administration in Belfast. Such changes in its positioning, ably directed by DUP deputy leader and campaign manager Peter Robinson MP, repositioned the party more competitively, especially in relation to the disaffected supporters of an openly fractious Ulster Unionist Party (UUP). The DUP had a long history as a party that favoured devolution, and neither the party nor many of its potential supporters wanted to bring down the new Assembly, they just wanted it run in a different manner, without Sinn Féin in government. 3 More obviously, Sinn Féin has also progressively moderated its position (notwithstanding current difficulties over decommissioning by the IRA). Since 1996 the party has been the principal electoral beneficiary of an end to active war. The IRA's cessation of its armed campaign, Sinn Féin's de facto acceptance of the consent principle (i.e. that Irish unification requires the consent of majorities in both parts of Ireland) and its enthusiastic participation in all of the Agreement's institutions have rendered the party more acceptable to others and more relevant to nationalist voters. While the peace process was the handmaiden of Sinn Féin's electoral 'second coming', 4 the incorporation of Sinn Féin into 'ordinary politics' has undermined the distinctiveness of the SDLP's own strategic position faster than anticipated. Especially for younger nationalist voters, the question increasingly arises: why not vote for the fresher and more assertive brand? For them the SDLP looked aged, and some of its Europeanist and 'post-national' talk cut little ice with voters focused on local issues and quarrels. While it is hard to imagine that the peace process could have been sustained without some electoral rewards for Sinn Féin, few expected the pace of its gains since 1994, and especially its breakout performance in 2001.
Overview of the results
Let us first overview the most dramatic findings of the 2001 Westminster elections. We can do this, first by reviewing the electoral map of Northern Ireland, with that of 1997 (see Figure 1) , and then by means of a graphic 'profit and loss account' (in absolute votes; see Figure 2 ). The map also confirms that unionists' demographic grip on Northern Ireland is slipping-they are retreating into their heartlands of North Armagh, North Down, Antrim and East Londonderry. A ring of DUP seats now flanks this heartland. Belfast, the distinctive epicentre of conflict, is becoming increasingly greener: the local government results held on the same day as the Westminster elections confirmed that Sinn Féin is the largest party in the city. But in 2001 unionists took three of its four Westminster (DUP: 2, UUP: 1). In the long run, with changing demography and with this electoral system, 5 it seems feasible that South Belfast may go to the SDLP and North Belfast to Sinn Féin.
The DUP had its best ever Westminster election, in seats and voteshare, and Sinn Féin for the fifth consecutive election had by far its strongest result. The much-touted moderate ground, and the centre of 'others', of Northern Ireland politics appears to be sinking (see Figure  2) . The fact that the DUP and Sinn Féin have partly achieved such gains by stealing the moderates' positions is likely to be of limited comfort to the UUP and SDLP, the formerly pre-eminent parties in the unionist and nationalist blocs respectively, who are now left, if not naked, at least partially disrobed.
Context and campaign
It was the first Westminster election since the Belfast Agreement had been signed, and partially implemented. The referendum to ratify the Agreement in May 1998 led to almost unanimous endorsement by nationalists, North and South. By contrast, it split unionists evenly into 'Yes' and 'No' camps, and their parties likewise: the UUP was for the Agreement, as were the small loyalist parties, the PUP and the UDP; the DUP was against, as was the small UKUP. The pro-Agreement UUP was itself deeply divided. A majority of its Westminster MPs opposed the Agreement, isolating its party leader David Trimble, though as the First Minister of the Assembly he had much stronger support amongst his Assembly members (MLAs).
The general election was called during a local crisis. Though the Agreement's institutions were functioning, deep fissures had erupted within the UUP and rendered Trimble very vulnerable. To compel Sinn Féin to coerce the IRA to start decommissioning its weapons he had embarked on a series of political sanctions. First, he blocked the two Sinn Féin ministers in the power-sharing executive from participating in the North-South Ministerial Council. The Sinn Féin Ministers and the SDLP Deputy First Minister, 6 Seamus Mallon, promptly took Trimble to court, and won, but Justice Kerr ruled his action 'unlawful' in January 2001. Trimble immediately appealed the decision-pending at the time of composition, but likely to go against him. Then just before the UK general election began, Trimble repeated the tactic he had deployed in 2000; he wrote a post-dated resignation letter, effective on July 1 2001, which he declared he would make effective if the IRA failed to move on decommissioning. His long-run calculation was that if his resignation became effective then the UK government would have to choose between suspending the Agreement's institutions (Trimble's preferred default), or leaving the Assembly to trigger fresh elections, because of its failure to replace the First and Deputy First Ministers within six weeks (12 August 2001) . His short-run calculation appears to have been that the resignation threat would immunise him, and his party's candidates, from criticism from other unionists over their willingness to share government with Sinn Féin in the absence of IRA decommissioning. Neither calculation was especially shrewd.
Nationalists had spent much of the year before the election trying to redress the UK government's failures to live up to its public promises faithfully to implement the Patten Report on policing, in letter and in spirit, as mandated by the Agreement. These failures were in turn used within the nationalist community to justify the IRA's failure to put its weapons verifiably beyond use, though it had twice supervised international inspections of its arms-dumps as a confidence-building measure, and organised one of these just before the general election. The SDLP had done considerable work at Westminster to amend what became the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000, but neither the Act nor the published implementation plans delivered the full Patten, only 'Patten lite'. Sinn Féin and the SDLP therefore made police reform and the full Patten report one of the central planks in their election campaigns-taking stances at odds with both the UUP and the DUP. Feedback from constituencies in unionist safe seats suggested that the UUP lost support to the DUP because of the scale of police reform, while the SDLP lost support to Sinn Féin amongst young nationalists because of the insufficiency of police reform, and because the SDLP appeared more pliant.
The campaign was conducted according to the logic of a dual party system, with competition within the unionist and nationalist blocs being much more important than competition across the blocs. 7 Unlike all other elections in Northern Ireland-local government, Assembly and European-the Westminster election is held under single-constituency plurality rule. One might therefore have expected to see some tacit agreement within the blocs to support a leading candidate in each constituency, to prevent the other bloc from winning a seat. That logic used to operate, especially within the unionist bloc where the imperative to keep out nationalists had restrained the DUP from campaigning against vulnerable UUP incumbents in 1997. Yet within the nationalist bloc, this logic has not operated at all in recent times, because the SDLP had not been prepared to organise pacts with a party associated with support for violence.
One might also have expected the fact that local government elections were being held on the same day, under the single-transferable vote (STV) system of proportional representation, to have restrained rhetorical criticism of rival parties within each bloc. There was no such spillover effect amongst party strategies. The parties fought each system separately, seeking to win under plurality rule at Westminster, while trying to maximise first preference and lower-order STV transfers in the local government ballots.
Competition within the unionist bloc, with the exception of Fermanagh and South Tyrone, 8 was unrestrained. The DUP did not stand in North Down in order to give anti-Agreement Robert McCartney (UK Unionist Party) a chance of holding his seat. The DUP personally targeted Trimble as a vacillating traitor. Its cartoons lampooned him as a bent-over old man with a long flowing white beard and a resignation letter stuck in his pocket with the caption 'Trust me. I will not wait indefinitely for IRA decommissioning'; its website mocked him as the IRA's delivery boy; it declared 'trust' in politicians was its central concern. For the local government elections the DUP advised its voters to give their lower-order preferences to 'like-minded', that is antiAgreement, unionists. The DUP's combination of hard-hitting attacks on Trimble, and its offer not to cause chaos, merely to renegotiate the Agreement, paid handsome dividends. Though it did not run candidates in four constituencies it came within a hair's breadth of becoming the largest unionist party in vote-share and seat-share in a Westminster general election. The party's one significant setback was to lose the seat it had gained in a by-election from the UUP, the Reverend William McCrea losing to David Burnside of the UUP. The UUP leader managed to get all his party's candidates to stand uncomfortably behind a common pro-Agreement platform, albeit one that heavily emphasised the need to achieve IRA decommissioning. This fooled no one, as many of his incumbent MPs (especially William Ross, William Thompson, and the Reverend Martin Smyth) were known to be anti-Agreement, and they tried to stave off criticism from the DUP by emphasising their anti-Agreement credentials. This, of course, merely added to the party's public disarray, aggravated when one of its elderly incumbent MPs, Cecil Walker, put in an embarrassing television performance that threw away the North Belfast seat to the DUP's Nigel Dodds MLA. The UUP's solitary success in nomination strategy was to run a new pro-Agreement candidate, Lady Sylvia Hermon, in North Down, where she toppled McCartney. In the local government elections Trimble advised that voters should 'primarily consider pro-Union candidates after the UUP', rather than other pro-Agreement candidates (BBC website, 26 May), the line taken by the SDLP. This advice made it less likely that small numbers of pro-Agreement Catholics would vote tactically for pro-Agreement UUP candidates.
Within the nationalist bloc Sinn Féin fought an energetic, disciplined, and well-funded campaign. The party's coffers are now swelled by legitimate fund-raising in both parts of Ireland and the USA, and it probably has more activists than any other party in Northern Ireland. It sought to increase its vote share (standing candidates in every one of the 18 constituencies), its seat-share, and to get the nationalist electorate's endorsement for the Agreement, and its stances on policing, demilitarisation and decommissioning. In the republican priority list, the latter was usually last amongst the matters needing to be implemented to fulfil everyone's obligations under the Agreement. Sinn Féin's success in achieving extraordinarily high turnouts, both in its safe and its target seats, is detailed below. Its vote-share rose in every constituency in Northern Ireland, except South Belfast, where it made no tactical sense to vote for the party's candidate. Sinn Féin appear to have won most of the new young nationalist voters, who endorsed the party even in locations where there was an SDLP incumbent, or where the SDLP candidate appeared to have the better chance of winning. Sinn Féin expected to win West Tyrone, where an even nationalist split in the vote had allowed William Thompson of the UUP victory in 1997; but it did not expect its candidate Michelle Gildernew to be so successful in Fermanagh and South Tyrone.
The SDLP's strategy was to portray itself as the key pro-Agreement party, one that had made the peace process and the Agreement possible, and one with a wider social democratic and good governance agenda. It trumpeted its successes in bringing together a programme of government out of the four parties in the Executive. It resisted appeals by the Alliance Party to form a pro-Agreement pact on seats, as did the UUP. The SDLP hoped to hold and slightly expand its vote-share, and to take one additional seat. In fact its total vote fell, but not by that much, in comparison with 1997-only approximately 20,000 across Northern Ireland. It targeted West Tyrone, withdrawing precious resources from Belfast, to support its high profile and Executive Minister for Agriculture Brid Rogers against the Sinn Féin Vice President Pat Doherty, to no avail.
The inter-ethnic or non-ethnic 'Others', principally the Alliance Party, were crushed in 2001. By comparison with previous elections, not only did the flanking parties take huge chunks from the moderates within their own blocs, but the moderates appear to have eroded the support of the Others, who also made tactical decisions to sacrifice their own prospects. The Alliance's proposals to make pro-Agreement candidate arrangements were firmly rebuffed by the UUP and SDLP, who were determined to maximise their share of the vote (Irish News, 3.4.01, 10.3.01).
The campaign once again highlighted the unreliability of polls in Northern Ireland, at least insofar as voters' intentions are concerned: they consistently understate the intensity of their political preferences. If the public had been anywhere near as moderate as they have generally represented themselves to pollsters during the last three decades there would not have been a Northern Ireland question. A Belfast Telegraph/ Irish Independent poll conducted by Irish Marketing Services published on 22 May suggested that the UUP, with 25% of respondents likely to vote for it, was 11 percentage points ahead of the DUP (14%), and that the SDLP (25%), was 9 percentage points ahead of Sinn Fein (16%). The poll did pick up two significant pointers: the young unionists are the most anti-Agreement, and in the 18-24 cohorts, Sinn Fein is the most popular party with 24% (compared with 15% for the UUP, 14% for the DUP and 13% for the SDLP, a portent of things to come).
Analysis of the results
The 9 This is not to say that alignments have been frozen and that nothing interesting ever happened, but dramatic gains and losses have been rare by any standards. For example, if we compare the change in vote shares of the five main parties in Northern Ireland (UUP, DUP, SDLP, SF and APNI) in Westminster elections, the volatility index at successive elections was 7% in 1987, 5.2% in 1992, 7.2% in 1997, but then doubled in 2001 to 14.5%. 10 To put this in perspective, the average aggregate volatility for nineteen European countries in the 1980s and 1990s was 9.2% and 11.5% respectively (for the UK alone, 3.3% and 9.3% in the same periods). 11 Similarly, seats very rarely changed hands between parties, 12 whereas in 2001 seven seats changed partisan control and three incumbents survived by narrow margins. In short, in 2001 Northern Ireland had a genuinely competitive and perhaps a watershed election.
Bloc performance
Before considering the performance of parties in detail, let us take stock of the overall bloc changes. In Britain Votes 1997, two of the present authors began with what they called a bold and falsifiable prediction. This was that the 1997 Westminster election would likely be the last in which the Unionist (with a capital 'U') bloc would win an overall majority of the votes cast in Northern Ireland. 13 At the 1997 general election the total U bloc (the UUP, DUP, UKUP, PUP, UDP and Conservatives) had managed just 50.5% of the total vote, compared with 40.2% for the Nationalist bloc, comprising the SDLP and Sinn Féin. Although the small Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI) supports the Union, it is usually not defined as part of the U bloc because of its moderate, bi-confessional and inter-ethnic position. In 2001 the prediction was falsified, although the logic behind the prediction is likely to prove accurate about future trends. In 2001 the U bloc actually improved its position to 52.1%, though the nationalist bloc grew by even more to 42.7% (see Table 1 and Figure 3) . The interesting question is: why did the U bloc not only hold its own but even manage a modest improvement?
Especially since 1996, unionist politicians and commentators have often explained unionists' less than optimal performances as due to differential abstentionism. In the absence of a full-scale election study (estimating which individual voters actually went to the polls) we have no direct information on the differential turnout of the unionist and nationalist blocs. An indirect analysis confirms that turnout does appear to be lower in unionist strongholds. 14 As explained in the note to Table  2 , the 18 Westminster constituencies (which in the 1998 Assembly elections served as multi-member constituencies, returning six members each) can be delineated into predominantly 'unionist', nationalist and 'balanced' constituencies on the basis of the 1998 results. For example, a predominantly 'unionist constituency' for the purposes of Table 2 is one in which at least four of the members returned to the 1998 Assembly self-identified as unionist. 15 The results in 1998 were clear and quite dramatic: the average turnout in 'unionist constituencies' was 64.6%, just over 10% lower than in 'nationalist constituencies'. Differential turnout is, of course, an important competitive dynamic in ethnic party systems, and these results may suggest that the unionist vote had been depressed by a lower willingness of unionists to turn out and vote, partly because there has often been a safe incumbent and no-intraunionist competition. Thus, a plausible explanation of the U bloc's improved position in 2001 is that the unionist parties were more successful in mobilising some of their more apathetic partisans in the context of a Westminster election that everyone believed would be the most competitive ever. After all, fear of losing seats to ethnic rivals is one of the classic motivators in such segmented party systems. But plausible as this proposition may seem, Table 2 indicates that it is incorrect. In 2001, as in previous elections, nationalists won the turnout wars: indeed the N bloc was even further ahead of the U bloc on this occasion (a lead of 10.7%).
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So how did the U bloc vote stay above 50%? The simplest explanation is much more prosaic than complex considerations of differential constituency turnout. Quite simply the U bloc in 2001 had one significant competitor missing: the Alliance party deployed candidates in only ten constituencies, seven fewer than in 1997, in effect sacrificing itself. The Alliance party, in attempting to maximise the chances of the leading pro-Agreement candidate in several constituencies, paid the price of seeing its own percentage vote cut in half (see Table 3 ). In several constituencies the UUP was a major beneficiary. Indeed, if most of Alliance's 7,553 votes in 1997 in North Down, historically the Alliance's strongest constituency, transferred to the UUP candidate in 2001 to defeat the anti-Agreement incumbent, as was the APNI's intention, then this 'gift' alone constitutes two-thirds of the U bloc's entire gains in 2001. 16 The results in 2001 were a triumph for the DUP and Sinn Féin; but big winners also beget big losers. The biggest of the losers was the UUP, now merely a front-runner compared with its former hegemonic domination of Northern Ireland politics. While 2001 certainly constituted the UUP's worst-ever Westminster election, in which for the first time in the modern party system it plummeted significantly below the 30% barrier to only 26.8%, it can be seen from Figure 4 that this is just the latest dip in a long-term decline. 17 By contrast, the trend line for the other big loser in 2001-the SDLP-had been a gentle but steady incline, benefiting from a growing Catholic population and a progressively more nationalist electorate. While the SDLP vote continued to rise, its rate of growth slowed appreciably as the 'peace process' continued, with most nationalist gains going to Sinn Féin. For example (see Figure 2) , the SDLP vote in 1997 was only a very modest 0.6% increase on its 1992 Westminster performance. Over the same time period Sinn Féin's vote jumped by 6.1% to a total of 16.1% in 1997 (a growth rate ten times higher than the SDLP!). Sinn Féin's accelerated growth continued in 2001 with a further gain of 5.6% to a new total of 21.7% (a 35% increase on its 1997 vote), thus capturing the long sought symbolic prize of becoming the largest nationalist party. Sinn Féin has gone from being an abstentionist party, as it was before 1982, to being the largest nationalist party today and probably the party with the greatest share of young voters, in less than 20 years. The answer to the question 'Who has benefited electorally from the peace process and Belfast Agreement?' could not be clearer.
Attempts to resolve protracted ethno-national conflicts tend not to be universally popular-if they were that would constitute proof that the conflict was not 'deep' or 'protracted'. Thus, while Sinn Féin has captured most of the electoral gains from nationalist enthusiasm for a long overdue process of institutional and policy change, the DUP appears to have ridden the tiger of opposition to these same changes. 'Just saying no' to compromises with one's inter-ethnic rivals has always been a successful strategy in such polarised party systems, but the DUP on this occasion cleverly combined its oppositional stance with partial cooperation with the new devolved governing arrangements, which are It has long been noted that Northern Ireland has a dual party system. It is only a mild exaggeration to say that each community holds its own election to decide who will be its pre-eminent tribunes. Winning seats from the other communal bloc, which rarely happens, is a bonus; the more serious party competition usually takes place within each segmented community. Party politics in such systems tends to be characterised by ethnic outbidding among rival parties within each bloc. Figure  5 provides a graphic representation of the changing fortunes of the principal combatants in both halves of the dual party system. It is quite clear that opposition to the peace process has been a powerful electoral weapon for the DUP, which has now almost managed to draw level with the UUP, even in Westminster elections.
As Figure 5 demonstrates a rough ratio of 60:40 in favour of the SDLP in 1996/97 has now been replaced by Sinn Féin emerging as marginally the largest nationalist party in both of the elections held on the same day in 2001. The local government elections, held as usual by single transferable vote, resulted in broadly similar but of course more proportional results (Table 1) . 18 The aggregate patterns are very similar-but as yet we cannot analyse the data on 'transfers' as the official tabulations have yet to be published-and so we cannot tell whether there was any significant evidence of cross-ethnic voting in lower-order preferences.
While winning the percentage battle for votes is undoubtedly very important, the seats of course are the actual jobs at stake. Northern Ireland voters, long accustomed to seeing about 17 of their 18 MPs returned in an election, struck a blow for a change in 2001, though their desired changes were often diametrically different. The net result however was that seven seats changed partisan control, and several other MPs survived narrowly. The UUP was the only major party to lose seats (the UKUP lost its single seat; this became the UUP's sole gain). 19 The UUP lost five seats (net four); of these three were lost to the DUP (Strangford, East Londonderry and North Belfast) and two to Sinn Féin (West Tyrone and Fermanagh and South Tyrone). Thus, the DUP gained three seats, Sinn Féin gained two, and the SDLP held its existing three seats. Thus the final seat total was UUP (6), DUP (5), Sinn Féin (4) and SDLP (3). In 2001 three of the new MPs are women (17%). While hardly reaching Scandinavian levels of gender representation this is novel for Northern Ireland. No woman had been elected at any Northern Ireland Westminster election since Bernadette Devlin was returned in 1970.
If the 1998 Assembly results, held under STV (PR), are taken as a reasonably faithful reflection of overall ethno-national bloc divisions then the 2001 Westminster seat allocations were a much more faithful reflection of overall bloc divisions than was the previous Westminster contest in 1997. In other words, the 'appropriate' bloc won all of the seats in 2001, whereas in 1997 two 'nationalist constituencies' returned UUP MPs (Fermanagh and South Tyrone and West Tyrone). The other four seats that changed hands in 2001 were simply changes in the balance of power within the unionist bloc (three UUP losses to the DUP, marginally compensated by one UUP gain from the UKUP). In other words the 2001 Westminster results were more proportional with respect to parties and ethnic blocs than 1997. Indeed, it is worth highlighting (see Table 1 ) that the disproportionality figure of 7.3 (on the least squares index) is by a massive margin the most proportional outcome of a Westminster election in Northern Ireland (the average for 1983-97 is 18.7). The decline of the UUP (and hence fall in its average seat bonus from a massive 23% in 1997 to only 6.5% in 2001) is the largest contributory factor. 20 This is not a commercial for the Westminster electoral system, which is highly inappropriate for the genuine multi-party system in Northern Ireland.
Conclusion and prospects
The election did not deliver David Trimble's desires. The IRA did not move on decommissioning and Trimble resigned as First Minister, though not as UUP party leader on 1 July. This provoked the sovereign governments into convening negotiations between pro-Agreement parties and themselves at Weston Park, Shropshire. A blame or blameavoidance game began.
Observers agreed that two parties and one government shared most of the blame for the impasses implementing the Belfast Agreement and stabilising its institutions: Sinn Fein, the UUP and the UK government.
The IRA had initiated decommissioning of its weapons, if one counts international inspections of its arms dumps, but it had not moved to implement its pledge of 2000 to put its weapons completely and verifiably beyond use. None of its complaints about the UK government's failures to deliver on its pledges absolved Sinn Fein from its obligations to build confidence amongst its governmental partners that they were not sharing power with a party with a private army, and nothing in the Agreement warranted the republican line that actual decommissioning must be the very last act of implementation. Prevarication merely maximised distrust about the IRA's long-run intentions.
The UUP had broken several of its obligations under the Agreement, while demanding that others deliver on their promises ahead of time. It blocked rapid executive formation. It rejected the Patten report on policing, though it met the Agreement's terms of reference. The First Minister blocked Sinn Fein ministers' legitimate participation in the North-South Ministerial Council. He has twice threatened resignation, and the collapse or suspension of the Agreement's institutions, to force Sinn Fein to deliver the IRA to his deadlines. He encouraged the UK government to make the first formal break with the Agreement, and international law, by-passing the Suspension Actin 2000, which Secretary of State Peter Mandelson used, and Trimble has continued to press for its use.
The UK government so far has dishonoured its pledge of May 2000, repeated in March 2001, to produce legislation and implementation plans fully reflecting the letter and the spirit of the Patten report on policing-which had flowed squarely from the Agreement. None of its excuses exonerate it in nationalist eyes, and it also has work to do to fulfil its obligations on demilitarisation, the review of the administration of justice and the protection of human rights.
At Weston Park the two governments sought to put together a package deal linking police reform, demilitarisation, decommissioning, and securing the Agreement's institutions. The talks were not successful in producing agreement, though they were not fruitless. The governments have currently agreed to organise and implement their own package. They will then have three choices: to leave further negotiation to the parties; to suspend the Agreement's institutions; or to have fresh Assembly elections. The first does not seem likely to work. The second option must be rejected by the Irish government, which regards the Suspension Act as a unilateral breach of a treaty. There is speculation about a variation on this option, viz. suspension for a day, followed by another six weeks for renewed negotiations before elections would have to occur. This option is unlikely to endear itself to nationalists and republicans. The third option is to have fresh Assembly elections, consequent upon the failure to re-elect successors to David Trimble and Seamus Mallon. The argument against elections is that they will help the DUP and Sinn Fein. Perhaps that possibility will act as an incentive for the UUP to compromise. But our analysis suggests that in any fresh Assembly elections the DUP and Sinn Fein would do best on moderated platforms. We might anticipate IRA initiatives on arms, and DUP 'renegotiation' briefings. And the emergence of both parties as the clear majority within their blocs would create a fascinating if dangerous spectacle. The two parties would have to choose: accept their respective nominees for the posts of First and Deputy First Ministers, accept moderate SDLP and UUP nominees for these posts, or have fresh elections. That is, they would have to choose between stealing their opponents' clothes and wearing them, or showing that they remain wolves in sheep's clothing.
